Distinguish descriptive, normative and metaethical relativism and assess the argument from cultural diversity and the objections to relativism

What this dot point is asking

SEAB wants you to handle moral relativism with care, distinguishing its several forms, assessing the popular argument that cultural diversity proves morality is relative, and weighing the standard objections. Relativism is the position students most often assert loosely, so the marks lie in precision: separating the empirical claim about diversity from the philosophical claim about truth, and showing why the one does not establish the other.

The answer

Three kinds of relativism

The word relativism covers three distinct theses that must be kept apart. Descriptive relativism is the empirical claim that, as a matter of fact, different cultures hold different moral codes. Normative relativism is the prescriptive claim that one ought to act according to the moral code of one's own culture. Metaethical relativism is the claim that moral truth itself is relative to a culture or framework, so that there is no culture-independent fact about what is right. These are logically independent: you can accept descriptive relativism while rejecting the other two.

The argument from cultural diversity

The common argument runs: different cultures have different moral codes (descriptive relativism), therefore there is no objective moral truth and all codes are equally valid (metaethical relativism). The crucial flaw is that the conclusion does not follow from the premise. The premise is a fact about what people believe; the conclusion is a claim about moral truth. From the mere fact that beliefs differ, it does not follow that none is correct, any more than disagreement among early astronomers showed there was no fact about the structure of the solar system. The argument is an is-ought slide unless an extra premise (such as "if codes differ, none is correct") is supplied, and that premise is exactly what is in dispute.

Overstated diversity

The empirical premise is also less dramatic than it looks. Much apparent moral diversity reflects shared underlying values applied to different circumstances or expressed through different customs. A society that cares for its elderly in the home and one that does so through institutions may share the value of honouring parents while differing in practice. When such cases are set aside, the residue of deep disagreement about ultimate values is smaller than the surface variety suggests, which weakens the argument from diversity further.

The standard objections to relativism

Metaethical and normative relativism face serious objections. The reformer problem: if right just means right-according-to-one's-culture, then a moral reformer who condemns their own society's accepted practice is by definition wrong, and moral progress is impossible, yet we honour reformers precisely for being right against their culture. The tolerance paradox: relativism is often urged in the name of tolerance, but a universal duty to tolerate other cultures is itself a non-relative moral claim, so relativism cannot consistently prescribe it. The individuation problem: cultures are not neatly bounded, people belong to several overlapping groups, so "the code of one's culture" is often indeterminate. Together these make thoroughgoing relativism hard to hold consistently.

A measured verdict

The defensible position grants descriptive relativism (codes do differ) while denying that it supports metaethical relativism (which does not follow and faces strong objections). This leaves room for a modest objectivism: there are some core moral norms (against gratuitous cruelty, betrayal and gross unfairness) that hold across frameworks, alongside genuine variation in customs and in the application of shared values. This honours the real diversity without collapsing into the view that any code is as good as any other.

Examples in context

Example 1. The moral reformer. Consider a campaigner who condemns a widely accepted but cruel practice in their own society and works to abolish it. On metaethical relativism, since the practice was right-according-to-their-culture, the reformer was wrong by definition, and their later success cannot count as moral progress. Yet we honour such reformers precisely for being right against their society. The case dramatises the reformer problem, a decisive difficulty for relativism.

Example 2. Diversity that dissolves on inspection. Two societies treat their dead very differently, one by burial and one by cremation, and this is cited as deep moral diversity. But both may share the value of honouring the dead and differ only in custom and belief about what honouring requires. The example shows how apparent moral diversity often reduces to shared values applied through different practices, undercutting the empirical premise of the argument from diversity.

Try this

Q1. Distinguish descriptive, normative and metaethical relativism. [6 marks]

• Cue. Descriptive: cultures in fact hold different codes (empirical). Normative: one ought to follow one's own culture's code (prescriptive). Metaethical: moral truth is relative to a framework, with no culture-independent fact.

Q2. Explain why descriptive relativism does not entail metaethical relativism. [8 marks]

• Cue. The fact that beliefs differ is not a claim about truth; people can disagree about questions that have correct answers (as in science), so inferring no-truth from diversity needs a question-begging extra premise.

Q3. Explain the tolerance paradox facing relativism. [6 marks]

• Cue. Relativism is often urged to support universal tolerance of other cultures, but a duty to tolerate everyone is itself a non-relative, objective moral claim, which relativism cannot consistently prescribe.