Are there objective moral facts that exist independently of what anyone thinks, or is morality our invention?
Contrast moral realism with anti-realist positions including error theory, emotivism and constructivism, and assess the arguments from queerness and moral experience
A focused answer on the metaethics of moral facts. Moral realism, error theory and the argument from queerness, emotivism and expressivism, constructivism, and the argument from moral experience, with a measured verdict.
Reviewed by: AI editorial process; not yet individually human-reviewed
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What this dot point is asking
SEAB wants you to engage the central metaphysical question of ethics: whether there are objective moral facts, existing independently of what anyone thinks, or whether morality is in some sense our construction or projection. This sits beneath the questions of moral knowledge and relativism. Your task is to contrast moral realism with the main anti-realist positions and to weigh the two master arguments, the argument from queerness against realism and the argument from moral experience for it.
The answer
Moral realism
Moral realism holds that there are objective moral facts, true independently of what any individual or culture believes, and that moral judgements aim to describe them. On this view "gratuitous cruelty is wrong" is true in much the way "the earth is round" is true: it reports a fact that does not depend on our attitudes. Realism comes in a naturalist version (moral facts are identical to or constituted by natural facts, such as facts about wellbeing or harm) and a non-naturalist version (moral facts are real but not reducible to natural ones).
Error theory
Error theory, associated with Mackie, agrees with realism that moral judgements aim to state objective facts, but holds that there are no such facts, so all positive moral judgements are systematically false. It is a cognitivist but anti-realist view: moral discourse is a massive, well-intentioned error. Its appeal is metaphysical economy; its cost is that it makes every moral claim, including "torturing children for fun is wrong," literally false, which is deeply revisionary.
Emotivism and expressivism
Emotivism, and its more sophisticated descendant expressivism, hold that moral judgements do not state facts at all but express attitudes: approval, disapproval, endorsement. To say "stealing is wrong" is, roughly, to voice disapproval of stealing and to encourage others to share it. This explains why moral judgements are motivating in a way that bare facts are not, but it struggles to account for moral truth and for the way moral claims embed in logical contexts (conditionals, arguments) as if they were truth-apt. Quasi-realism is the project of recovering ordinary talk of moral truth within an expressivist framework.
Constructivism
Constructivism offers a middle path. Moral truths are neither mind-independent facts nor mere expressions of feeling; they are constituted by what suitably idealised rational agents would agree to, or by the standards implicit in practical reasoning itself. This secures a kind of objectivity, the standards are not up to any individual, without positing queer mind-independent facts. Its challenge is to specify the relevant idealisation (which agents, under what conditions) without circularity or smuggling in the very values it is meant to ground.
The two master arguments
The leading argument against realism is the argument from queerness. Objective moral facts would be metaphysically strange, intrinsically action-guiding in a way no natural fact is, and knowing them would seem to require a special faculty unlike ordinary perception; by parsimony we should deny them, which yields error theory. The leading argument for realism is the argument from moral experience: we experience some moral claims as simply true rather than as projections, and we reason about ethics as though seeking facts, revising our views in light of argument; realism best explains this moral phenomenology. Naturalist realists answer the queerness charge by identifying moral facts with natural ones, knowable by ordinary means, and non-naturalists reply that we accept non-natural truths elsewhere (in mathematics), so the charge proves too much.
Examples in context
Example 1. The clearest moral truth. Almost everyone treats "torturing a child purely for amusement is wrong" as among the most certain things they know, more certain than many scientific claims. This is the argument from moral experience in concentrated form: a view like error theory, which must call this claim false, conflicts with our most secure moral knowledge, which is a strong mark against it and in favour of some form of realism or robust objectivity.
Example 2. Constructed yet objective rules. The rules of a fair procedure, such as what counts as a just allocation under agreed conditions, are not mind-independent facts floating in the universe, yet they are not up to any individual either: they follow from what reasonable agents would accept. This illustrates constructivism, which models moral truth on such idealised agreement, securing objectivity without the metaphysical extravagance the argument from queerness attacks.
Try this
Q1. Distinguish moral realism, error theory and expressivism. [6 marks]
- Cue. Realism: objective moral facts exist and judgements describe them. Error theory: judgements aim at facts but all are false (no facts). Expressivism: judgements express attitudes, not facts, so are not straightforwardly true or false.
Q2. Explain the argument from queerness and how a naturalist realist responds. [8 marks]
- Cue. Objective moral facts would be metaphysically and epistemically strange, knowable only by a special faculty, so parsimony denies them; the naturalist replies that moral facts are natural facts (about wellbeing, harm), knowable by ordinary means, so not queer.
Q3. Explain how constructivism secures objectivity without mind-independent moral facts. [6 marks]
- Cue. Moral truths are constituted by what idealised rational agents would agree to, so the standards are not up to any individual (objective) yet are not mind-independent facts in the realist's sense; the challenge is specifying the idealisation without circularity.
Exam-style practice questions
Practice questions written in the style of SEAB exam questions on this dot point, with worked answer explainers. The year tag is the paper they imitate, not the source.
Original20 marksAre there objective moral facts? Discuss moral realism and at least one anti-realist alternative.Show worked answer →
A strong answer defines moral realism: there are objective moral facts, true independently of what any individual or culture believes, and moral judgements aim to describe them. It then sets out anti-realist alternatives: error theory (moral judgements aim at facts but all are systematically false because no moral facts exist); emotivism and expressivism (moral judgements express attitudes, not fact-stating beliefs); and constructivism (moral truths are constituted by what idealised rational agents would agree to, so they are objective-enough without being mind-independent in the realist's sense).
Present the main argument against realism, the argument from queerness: objective moral facts would be metaphysically strange (unlike anything else in the natural world) and would require a special faculty to know, so parsimony tells against them. Present the main argument for realism, the argument from moral experience (and moral phenomenology): we experience some moral claims (gratuitous torture is wrong) as simply true, not as projections, and we reason about morality as if seeking facts, which realism explains best.
Evaluate: realism honours moral phenomenology and the objectivity of core norms but owes an account of queer facts and moral knowledge; error theory is parsimonious but wildly revisionary (it makes all our moral judgements false); expressivism explains motivation but struggles with moral truth and logical embedding; constructivism offers a middle path but must specify the idealisation without circularity.
Judgement: defend a position, for example a naturalist realism or a robust constructivism that secures objectivity while answering the queerness worry. Markers reward clear definitions of realism and at least one anti-realism, both master arguments, and a decided conclusion.
Original12 marksExplain the argument from queerness against moral realism and one response to it.Show worked answer →
The expected answer states the argument (associated with Mackie). It has two strands. The metaphysical strand: objective moral facts or properties would be utterly unlike anything else in the universe, intrinsically action-guiding and prescriptive in a way no natural fact is, so positing them is ontologically extravagant. The epistemological strand: knowing such facts would require a special faculty of moral perception or intuition unlike ordinary perception, which is mysterious. By parsimony, we should deny such facts exist, which yields error theory (all positive moral claims are false).
Then give a response. Naturalist realists reply that moral facts are not queer because they are identical to, or constituted by, natural facts (about wellbeing, harm, cooperation), which we know by ordinary empirical and rational means, so no special faculty is needed. Alternatively, non-naturalist realists argue that other respectable domains (mathematics, normativity in general) involve non-natural truths we accept, so morality is no worse off, and the charge of queerness proves too much.
Judgement-style close: the argument from queerness has force against a non-natural, free-floating realism but is blunted if moral facts are natural or if abstract truths are admitted elsewhere. Markers reward both strands of the argument, the link to error theory, and a clear, well-explained response.
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